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Monetary Policy Strategy And The Euro:   







This paper examines how the fixed exchange rate policy followed in Cyprus for more than 
40 years helped to deliver price stability amid high growth rates and low unemployment, 
and contributed to the successful adoption of the euro.  The paper identifies some critical 
elements for the success of this strategy.  Firstly, this policy was pursued by the Central 
Bank with no devaluations even in the most adverse conditions.  This hard earned 
credibility of the Central Bank, along with the fact that the Bank’s decisions were taken 
independently from political interference, reinforced people’s belief in this strategy and thus 
anchored inflation expectations.  Secondly, in order to ensure the sustainability of the 
regime, the authorities followed prudent economic policies for most of the time.   The 
developments in credit and the current account served as warning indicators signalling 
possible threats to the sustainability of the fixed rate regime. Thirdly, in cases of imbalances 
the Central Bank resorted to the temporary use of non-traditional tools such as credit 
ceilings.  The paper shows how this strategy was used to confront the new challenges 
arising from the road to the European Union (EU).  Although the fixed exchange rate 
strategy remained in essence unchanged, it became more focused on the European 
orientation of the economy by switching to new anchor currencies (the ecu and the euro) 
well before accession.  At the same time, a well thought out programme of structural 
reforms was underway in preparation for accession to the EU.  Once in the EU the fixed 
exchange rate policy continued but greater flexibility was allowed so as to meet the 
challenges of the new liberalised environment. 
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1. Introduction 
The design of appropriate monetary and exchange rate policies largely depends 
upon a country’s specific economic characteristics and the challenges ensuing from 
the international environment.  In Cyprus, pegged exchange rates were long 
considered as an anti-inflationary tool. In fact, following the establishment of the 
Central Bank of Cyprus (CBC) in 1963, i.e. three years after the island’s 
independence, a pegged exchange rate regime was in place up until accession to the 
euro area.  It was believed that the establishment of an unambiguous objective 
anchor for economic policy would induce greater discipline, instil confidence in the 
currency and help to establish credibility for measures to bring down inflation.  A 
number of other characteristics of the Cypriot economy, such as its size and 
openness, wage indexation and, in the past, the rigidity of interest rates and the 
existence of capital controls all made a strong case for a fixed exchange rate 
arrangement, placing the burden of containing inflation on the exchange rate. 
 
In the early 1990s, Cyprus’s aspiration to become a member of the EU rekindled the 
debate about the appropriate exchange rate policy.  The question that was brought to 
the fore related to the optimal exchange rate strategy for the eventual adoption of the 
euro, as the design of such a strategy needed to take into account the specific 
requirements that the euro adoption process entailed.  In particular, the road 
towards the euro required the complete abolition of capital controls by the time of 
EU accession, along with some other EU induced structural reforms and the 
fulfilment of the Maastricht criteria, which entailed, inter alia, participation in the 
Exchange Rate Mechanism II (ERM II) for at least two years. 
 
The purpose of this paper is twofold.  First, to examine the historical evolution of the 
exchange rate strategy in Cyprus for delivering price stability.  Particular attention is 
given to the   conditions that were required under a fixed exchange rate regime as to 
be credible and sustainable. Second, how, having delivered low inflation and high 
economic growth in Cyprus, this strategy was used to lead the economy into the 
euro area.  We discuss the choices and the challenges that the Cypriot monetary 
authorities were confronted with in the run-up to EU accession and the adoption of 
the single currency, against the background of a pegged exchange rate regime and a 
monetary policy strategy which was oriented towards maintaining price stability 
through the exchange rate.  To this end, we begin by reviewing the considerations 
that guided exchange rate policy in Cyprus as well as assessing the efficacy of this 
policy in keeping inflation down and helping the growth prospects of the economy.  3 
We then discuss the various challenges that under some circumstances tested the 
specific policy settings, with the aim of eventually arriving at the policy mix which 
was of paramount importance for the successful monetary integration of Cyprus into 
the euro area. The paper concludes that, as the case of Cyprus exemplifies, the 
pursuit of a credible pegged exchange rate strategy aimed at maintaining price 
stability through exchange rate stability, may well lead to the smooth and successful 
monetary integration of a country and thus can be considered a potential strategy   
for euro aspirants. This is especially plausible if such a strategy is reinforced and 
augmented by the prudent monitoring of money (credit) aggregates and the 
judicious screening of external balances.  In the case of Cyprus the deployment of 
non-traditional policy tools, such as quantitative credit restraints, on a temporary 
basis and according to prevailing conditions might have helped stabilize monetary 
growth given the capital controls which had been in place for most of the period 
under consideration.  This strategy could be particularly useful for a country trying 
to bring its inflation down and achieve a high degree of convergence in nominal and 
real terms with the EU during the pre-accession phase.  The aspirant country will 
then be in a better position to address the fresh challenges that might arise from 
accession and potential entry into ERM ΙI, as the case of Cyprus and other new 
member countries have shown. 
 
2. Salient features of the Cyprus economy and exchange rate policy: a story of pegs 
Cyprus has a small, open and services oriented economy with the ratio of total trade 
(exports plus imports of goods and services) to GDP of around 1. The tertiary sector 
now accounts for approximately 80% of total gross value added, a trend which has 
become stronger over the last two decades. Real GDP growth has been historically 
robust, averaging 6% since the island’s independence in 1960, and consistently above 
the average trend for the euro area as well as for the EU as a whole (see Figure 1).  
As a result, Cyprus has achieved a satisfactory degree of sustainable real 
convergence with the EU. In 2007 Cyprus’s per capita GDP in PPS terms accounted 
for 91,9%  of the EU average. Traditionally, private consumption, exports of services 
and, to lesser extent, investment have been the main growth drivers. 
 
In line with this robust track record of real GDP growth, the unemployment rate has 
historically been lower and more stable than in the rest of the EU (see Figure 2). 
Indeed, this stability has been remarkable. The short-lived spike during the period 
1974-1975, was due to the devastating effects of the military invasion of the island by 
Turkey in 1974. Even though one third of the population became internally displaced 4 
and one third of the island became occupied, the economy recovered very quickly 
and unemployment fell to its normal level.  
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                                                                                  Source: CBC. 5 
Though one might expect high economic growth in conjunction with low 
unemployment to lead to higher inflation, this did not materialize in Cyprus. As is 
shown in the next section, inflation remained relatively contained throughout the 
years, an outcome that could be attributed to the prudent monetary and exchange 
rate policies that had been followed by the CBC since its establishment in 1963.  
 
Historically, exchange rate policy in Cyprus can be characterised as "pegging" with 
the Cyprus pound linked to an anchor currency.  Having chosen fixed exchange 
rates as the appropriate regime, the remaining issue for the authorities was the 
choice of a proper anchor currency.  Initially, the Cyprus pound was tied to sterling 
with a fixed parity.  The "generalised floating" that came about with the demise of 
the Bretton Woods system called for a revision of this policy since continuation of 
pegging to sterling, or for that matter to any of the major currencies, would in effect 
have meant floating vis-à-vis all other currencies. 
 
Following the demise of Bretton Woods the pound was linked to an import-
weighted basket, and in 1984 to a trade-weighted basket. In 1992 Cyprus’s aspiration 
to become a member of the EU led to a reconsideration of the choice of currency 
basket.  More specifically, on 19 June 1992 the Cyprus pound was unilaterally 
pegged to the ecu, with the central rate of CY£1=ECU 1,7086 and fluctuation margins 
of ±2,25%, reflecting the policy of linking the economy more closely to the economies 
of the EU.  Although the ecu basket did not fully reflect Cyprus’s composition of 
trade, the choice of the ecu anchor represented a policy of tying the Cyprus pound to 
the currencies of a group of countries, most notably Germany and those countries 
with their currencies tied to the D-Mark, whose prime goal was price and 
macroeconomic stability. Such an exchange rate policy was intended to contribute 
further to the maintenance of price and macroeconomic stability in Cyprus as well as 
to the enhancement of international competitiveness. 
 
The creation of the EMU and the introduction of the euro posed new challenges to 
Cyprus’s exchange rate policy and, more generally, to the economy.  Our currency 
anchor, the ecu, ceased to exist and was replaced by the euro on 1 January 1999.  
Despite the fact that the UK, our major trading partner, opted to stay out of the euro 
area, a decision was taken to link the Cyprus pound to the euro with a central rate 
and margins equal to those of the ecu.  This was taken on the grounds of the anti-
inflationary credentials of the new currency, engraved firmly in the ECB’s legal 6 
mandate, as well as in the light of our efforts to harmonise with the EU acquis1.  The 
same exchange rate policy was adopted after Cyprus joined the EU in 2004 and the 
following year when the Cyprus pound was linked to the euro and officially 
participated in ERM II.  The policy, designed back in 1992, of unilaterally linking the 
Cyprus pound to the ecu culminated in the adoption of the euro as the island’s legal 
tender in 2008. 
 
One might argue that, in the first decades, exchange rate policy was geared primarily 
towards facilitating trade flows.  With the linking of the Cyprus pound to sterling 
the authorities were aiming to minimize fluctuations in the prices of exports and 
imports.  The same logic could also explain the switch to a basket of currencies after 
the collapse of the Bretton Woods system. However, against the setting of a small 
and open economy, it was recognised soon after the establishment of the CBC that 
targeting the exchange rate would be an appropriate means for achieving the CBC’s 
primary objective of price stability. To the extent that our major trading partners 
remained committed to price stability, managing the exchange rate by pegging the 
Cyprus pound to a strong anchor---be it a single currency or a basket of currencies of 
our main trading partners---could deliver the desired price stability objective. A 
strong peg would also contribute towards anchoring inflation expectations, thereby 
alleviating any possible second round effects of temporary shocks and thus further 
facilitating the achievement of price stability.  The objective of price stability received 
extra impetus with the switch to, at first, the ecu and then subsequently to the euro 
as the anchor currency. These two currencies were chosen for their anti-inflationary 
credentials, rather than their reflection of the composition of trade. 
 
3. Keeping inflation at bay 
As has already been suggested, the arrangement of pegged exchange rates has 
contributed to the containment of inflation in Cyprus.  The monetary strategy of 
achieving price stability through exchange rate stability was applied resolutely in a 
credible and consistent fashion by the CBC. The long track record of price stability in 
Cyprus is the most obvious proof of the success of this strategy.  
 
 
                                                           
1 See Kyriacou and Syrichas (1999) on the macroeconomic implications of the introduction of the euro for the 
Cypriot economy. 7 
Looking back over a period of more than 40 years,  inflation in Cyprus has been 
contained, averaging between 2%-3% with the most notable exception being the 
experience of the 1970s (see Figure 3).  Inflation was higher in the 1970s mainly 
because of the impact of the two oil shocks.  But even during that decade, inflation in 
Cyprus was considerably lower than in the countries of its anchor currencies.  As can 
be readily inferred from Figure 3, the only country with a superior performance in 
terms of price stability was Germany.  Germany’s performance was the result of the 
clear price stability mandate of the Deutche Bundesbank and the monetary target 
strategy that was pursued after the collapse of the fixed exchange rate regime 
(Issing, 2005).  As we have seen in the case of Cyprus, no monetary switching took 
place in the face of the collapse of Bretton Woods.  However, this policy of fixed 
exchange rate targeting delivered price stability even in the face of severe adverse 
conditions vis-a-vis the invasion of 1974.  As Orphanides (2008) points out  "in 
retrospect, the experience of Cyprus may serve as an instructive example of the long-term 
benefits of a monetary policy focused on price stability, even in the presence of dislocations 
that might have been seen as providing cover for looser, less responsible monetary policy in 
other contexts" (pp. 372-373).  
 









































































Cyprus Euro area Germany
UK USA
% 
                                                                                                                                           
          S o u r c e :   C B C .  
A casual observation of the data and the structural characteristics of the economy 
reveals some of the factors that affect the Consumer Price Index (CPI) in Cyprus.  8 
Table 1 shows some of the many possible determinants of inflation which may have 
played a substantial role historically2. 
 
Table 1: Determinants of inflation 
                                                                                  Source: CBC. 
(a)  The ratio of exports and imports of goods and services to GDP in Cyprus is 
around 1. As a result, world price developments have a significant impact on 
domestic inflation.  In particular the import unit value rose by 14,8% in the 
1970s reflecting the oil price boom and was largely responsible for the hike in 
inflation observed in Cyprus during this period. Subsequently, the import 
unit value slowed down to 1,7% contributing to a significantly lower inflation 
during the 1980s. 
(b)  The high degree of openness of the Cypriot economy implies that domestic 
price developments are not only influenced by oil prices but also by exchange 
rate movements.  A significant portion of the declining inflation during the 
1980s can be attributed to the substantial appreciation of the Cyprus pound.  
Specifically, the drop in inflation from 13,5% in 1980 to only 1,2% in 1986 can 
be partly attributed to the 9% appreciation of the nominal effective exchange 
rate of the Cyprus pound. 
(c)  Wage expansion is also a factor in the inflation process in Cyprus.  Wage 
growth, both in nominal and real terms, during the period 1963–2007 
exceeded productivity gains which averaged 3,7% in the same period. The 
                                                           
2 For a formal analysis of the transmission channels in Cyprus see Karamanou et al (2001) and Spanos et al 
(1997). 
PERCENTAGE CHANGE 
1963 1963 1971 1981 1991  2001 
-2007 -1970 -1980 -1990 -2000  -2007 
CONSUMER PRICES 4,37 1,47 7,88 4,90 3,83  2,67 
INDEX OF RATES OF PAY (REAL TERMS) 1980=100 4,76 3,80 7,78 5,14 3,42  2,64 
INDEX OF RATES OF PAY (MONEY TERMS) 1980=100 9,45 5,29 16,38 10,31 7,39  5,41 
GROSS OUTPUT/NO OF PERSONS ENGAGED 9,65 6,87 10,88 10,73 11,53  6,81 
M 11,90 10,69 13,64 11,45 9,42  15,00 
M 13,18 10,58 16,16 14,39 12,42  11,26 
GDP (CURRENT PRICES)  10,57 9,50 13,82 12,92 8,58  6,64 
USD/CYP  -0,10 -1,81 1,85 -2,03 -2,82  5,74 
CHANGE IN GLOBAL CONSUMER PRICES  11,57 5,40 12,11 16,74 12,63  3,66 
UNEMPLOYMENT RATE  3,12 1,48 4,67 2,93 2,96  3,29 
IMPORT UNIT VALUE WORLD  4,89 3,01 14,81 1,67 -0,78  5,02 
INDIRECT TAX  13,12 9,53 16,13 13,93 11,48  14,51 
PRODUCTIVITY  3,69 5,69 6,37 3,15 1,85  1,01 9 
upward trend in wages can be linked to two prominent features of the 
Cypriot economy since independence, low unemployment and wage 
indexation.   
(d)  The growth rate of money has been broadly in line with the growth of 
nominal GDP suggesting that inflation in Cyprus cannot be attributed to 
excessive monetary growth.  During the last decade, however, money creation 
as measured by broad money grew faster than the expansion of GDP, 
indicating that monetary conditions might have also contributed to the 
inflation process during this period. 
The cursory analysis of the overall CPI over the years 1963-2007 provides some 
understanding of the inflation process in Cyprus. Valuable information  is also 
revealed by looking at the components of the CPI.  Most of the CPI’s volatility 
during 1984-2007 is due to the variability exhibited by locally produced products.  
As can be seen from Figure 4, locally produced products are primarily responsible 
for the spikes observed in the CPI index.  Within this category the most volatile 
component is that of agricultural products.  The vagaries of the weather, with its 
significant short-term impact on the production and prices of agricultural products, 
is largely responsible for the volatility of the agricultural component of the CPI.   
More specifically, agricultural products with less than 8% of the weighted 
contribution accounted for almost 25% in the growth of the CPI for the years 2000 
and 2004.  Figure 4 also confirms the previous analysis that inflation in Cyprus has 
remained at low levels on the back of imported products whose prices follow a 
distinct negative trend.  In other words, under the fixed exchange rate regime 
Cyprus was importing on average the inflation of its trading partners.   
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                                                                                     Source: CBC. 10 
4. Critical elements to the success 
The performance of Cyprus in terms of inflation over a period of more than 40 years 
has been impressive, all the more so in the context of fast economic growth and full 
employment conditions.  This achievement can primarily be attributed to a simple 
monetary policy rule: a clear and unambiguous pegging of the exchange rate.  The 
strict adherence of the CBC to this simple rule was seen during the period of the 
Turkish invasion and its aftermath, as well as during the ERM crisis in 1992.  During 
these two critical periods the pound remained firmly pegged even though there 
were significant competitiveness losses resulting from devalued currencies.  These 
two events helped to streghthen the CBC’s reputation for maintaining 
macroeconomic stability. 
 
It was also recognised that apart from losing one’s credibility, a policy of devaluation 
would have eventually exacerbated inflation. Full employment conditions, the 
existence of the cost of living adjustment (COLA), and low price elasticities for the 
demand for exports and imports of goods (with the sum estimated to be less than 
unity), meant that a currency devaluation in Cyprus would have brought a 
worsening of the trade account with the higher demand for exports completely offset 
by the resulting higher increase in expenditure on imports. In addition, the 
dependence of the economy on imports meant that any short-term benefits accruing 
from a devaluation would have been offset by the higher cost of imports and the 
subsequent rise in prices due to the prevalence of COLA in wage contracts. 
 
The CBC’s commitment to price stability through exchange rate targeting, was a 
simple and transparent rule that could be evaluated at any point in time just by 
looking at the external value of the Cyprus pound.   The testing of this rule during 
difficult times reinforced people’s belief in this strategy and anchored inflation 
expectations. The success of this policy also rested on the fact that the decisions of 
the CBC were taken independently from any political interference.  Although CBC 
independence was only officially granted in 2002, the government’s representative 
on the CBC’s Board of Directors very rarely, if ever, objected to the Board’s monetary 
policy decisions.     
 
The resolve, credibility and independence of the CBC were necessary but not 
sufficient conditions for ensuring the success of the exchange rate targeting strategy.  
The authorities recognized the well-established "impossible trinity" theorem in 
international economics i.e. it is not possible for a country to follow an autonomous 11 
monetary policy under a fixed exchange rate regime in an environment of 
unrestricted capital mobility.  Violation of the trinity would lead to the eventual 
collapse of the fixed exchange rate regime. Therefore the authorities needed to 
ensure that monetary conditions were consistent with economic fundamentals.   
 
In the light of the above, Orphanides (2008) identifies additional elements that had 
contributed to the success of this policy. The first element was the close monitoring 
of monetary aggregates and credit, particularly credit to the private sector, with a 
view towards reigning in excessive rates of expansion that might threaten stability. 
The second element was the close monitoring of the current account deficit, both as 
an indicator of inflationary pressures and as a warning signal helping to avoid 
external imbalances. The theoretical underpinnings of this strategy can be found in 
the balance of payments crises literature (see among others Krugman, 1979 and 
Flood and Garber, 1984).  Utilizing a simple monetary model Flood and Garber have 
shown that in a small country with purchasing power parity and free capital 
mobility, excessive credit growth will lead to a gradual draining of foreign reserves.  
Agents anticipating the eventual exhaustion of reserves and the collapse of the fixed 
exchange rate regime will launch an attack on the regime.  Therefore one might infer 
from Flood and Garber the importance of closely monitoring the expansion of credit 
and the state of the current account (i.e. the level of foreign reserves) for the 
sustainability of a parity. Exactly what the Cypriot authorities had been doing.   
 
There were some instances where economic behaviour (as reflected in monetary 
aggregates) was not consistent with economic fundamentals.  The trinity was 
violated and consequently the sustainability of the regime was threatened.  Capital 
controls prevailing in Cyprus for most of the period under consideration certainly 
helped the authorities to get around the impossible trinity and contributed to the 
sustainment of the fixed exchange rate regime.  However, the importance of capital 
controls cannot be overemphasised.  The literature (e.g. Wyplosz, 1986) and country 
experiences around the world have shown that capital restrictions might delay a 
speculative attack but cannot prevent the eventual collapse of a fixed rate regime if 
inconsistent policies are followed for a sufficiently long period of time.  The 
longevity of the Cypriot regime should primarily be attributed to the fact that for 
most of the time the authorities followed prudent policies.  In the periods when 
undesirable economic developments arose the authorities followed a flexible 
strategy which adapted to the prevailing economic environment.  The success of the 
specific strategy in Cyprus relates to the deployment of non-traditional policy tools 12 
such as quantitative credit restraints. According to Orphanides (2008) these tools 
"proved useful supplements to the more traditional tools---and indeed sometimes the crucial 
main tools---for controlling threats towards imbalances.  Non-traditional tools were used 
with caution, however, in order to control and correct imbalances in the short-term, and not 
to obscure and prolong them.  Care was needed, of course, because it was well understood 
that, when improperly used, controls and restraints can easily engender unsustainable 
imbalances thus increasing the risk of economic collapse at a later stage" (p. 374). 
 
Figure 5 illustrates the timing of imposition and relaxation of credit ceilings during 
periods of hardship. The most significant ones occurred in: 1967, when credit 
ceilings were relaxed to encourage growth; 1980, when credit ceilings were imposed 
to contain inflationary pressures; and 1999, when credit ceilings were imposed to 
contain stock market exuberance. 
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                                                                 Source: Orphanides (2008). 
 
5. EU accession:  financial liberalisation and exchange rate policy 
Most accession countries are faced with the challenge of designing an appropriate 
exchange rate strategy that will eventually lead to the adoption of the euro. The EU 
position is that in the pre–accession phase no single strategy is prescribed and 13 
accession countries are free to choose any regime they consider appropriate, ranging 
from currency board arrangements to free floating.  Upon accession, exchange rate 
policy will have to be treated as a matter of common interest, refraining from 
competitive devaluations.  Accession countries will still have the flexibility in the 
choice of exchange rate regime, but they are expected to join ERM II before adopting 
the euro.  ERM ΙΙ can accommodate several exchange rate arrangements, including 
euro based currency boards (stopping short of floating), crawling pegs and pegging 
to currencies other than the euro. 
 
For Cyprus the exchange rate strategy for accession to ERM and adoption of the euro 
had been in place as early as 1992, 12 years before accession to the EU. Preparations 
were not confined to exchange rate policy only but were extended to other areas, 
most notably the monetary and banking sectors.  This was to ensure that the 
transition to a new liberalised environment be based on a well thought out and 
encompassed programme. In the middle of the 1990s a new operational framework 
for conducting monetary policy through open market operations was launched.   
This prepared the ground for the introduction of two important structural reforms in 
Cyprus.  First, and foremost, the abolition of the long-lived statutory interest rate 
ceiling, which was accompanied by a relaxation of all restrictions on medium and 
long-term foreign borrowing by Cypriots.  The second reform was the new Banking 
Law introduced by the CBC with the aim of strengthening supervision and 
prudential rules.  This reform was essential so as to enable the banking system to 
cope in an environment of destabilizing capital flows and asset booms.  
 
Heading for EU membership and ERM II participation meant that financial 
liberalisation was unavoidable.  Therefore, the authorities could no longer rely on 
restrictions to sustain the parity.  Upon accession the fixed exchange rate strategy 
was confronted with some fresh challenges.  The policy of keeping relatively fixed 
exchange rates in a liberalised environment was soon to be tested.  Following the 
abolition in January 2001 of restrictions on medium-term and long-term borrowing 
with maturities of over two years by residents, capital inflows rose significantly as 
private individuals and firms increased their borrowing in foreign currency, mostly 
euro, taking advantage of the interest rate differential between euro-denominated 
and Cyprus pound–denominated loans.  This exerted an upward pressure on the 
exchange rate, and it also exposed borrowers to increased exchange rate risks.  These 
developments prompted the CBC to abolish the narrow bands of ±2,25% on 13 
August 2001, so that only the ±15% margins remained, in line with ERM II.  But 14 
despite the abolition of the ±2,25% bands, the fluctuations remained within these 
narrow bands.  Thus, investors showed confidence in our exchange rate policy in 
general and our currency in particular. 
 
The policy decision of 13 August 2001 was taken concurrently with another 
important decision i.e. to reduce interest rates by 50 basis points, deemed necessary 
due to the anticipated negative impact of the global economic slowdown on the 
Cyprus economy.  The decline in interest rates in Cyprus also reduced the interest 
rate differential between euro-denominated and pound-denominated loans, which 
further removed some of the incentive for residents to borrow in foreign currency.  
Interest rates were subsequently reduced further in September and November 2001, 
by 50 basis points each time. 
 
In addition, significant capital flows were difficult to manage and could undermine 
the effectiveness of monetary policy.  Substantial capital inflows were largely 
responsible for the excess liquidity that had been observed in Cyprus since the 
beginning of 2001.  The CBC intervened regularly in the market to mop-up the 
excess liquidity so as to prevent monetary policy from becoming too lax.  The 
operations conducted by the CBC at the time were facilitated by the fact that 
demand for credit remained subdued during 2002, compared with the previous year 
and, therefore, commercial banks were willing to surrender their excess liquidity to 
the CBC.  The financial dimension of these operations should not be ignored as 
sterilised interventions were depleting the CBC’s profits.  The problem was further 
complicated by the fact that limited exchange rate flexibility caused the build-up of 
unhedged foreign liabilities by domestic firms.  In the case of a successful attack on 
the peg, the ensuing devaluation that would result would pose a significant cost to 
the balance sheet of firms, the banking system and, ultimately, to the economy. 
 
The aforementioned experience highlights the difficulty facing the authorities when 
using the exchange rate as a nominal anchor.  As for the sustainability issue there is 
much debate among economists with some subscribing to the "bipolar view" or the 
corner solutions view3.  According to this view, only the two extreme forms of 
exchange rate regimes, i.e. credible hard pegs, such as currency boards on euro, or 
freely floats are viable. Intermediate regimes such as soft pegs are considered to be 
                                                           
3 See Fischer (2001). 15 
crisis prone and increasingly less feasible in an environment of more integrated 
capital markets. 
The conduct of monetary and exchange rate policy was further complicated in 2004 
by adverse fiscal conditions in conjunction with political uncertainty surrounding 
the prospects for the solution of the Cyprus problem and unfounded rumours of an 
imminent devaluation of the Cyprus pound.  The severe capital outflows and the 
concomitant currency depreciation pressures in the aftermath of these developments 
required the CBC to exercise increased vigilance and support by all means the 
exchange rate.  At an extraordinary meeting on the eve of EU accession, the CBC’s 
Monetary Policy Committee decided to increase its interest rates by 100 basis points 
and at the same time to send a strong signal supporting the Cyprus pound. 
Consequently markets calmed and capital flows returned to their normal seasonal 
pattern.  In this connection, the success to communicate properly and the readiness 
of the Central Bank to maintain policy consistency towards achieving the primary 
objective at any cost was imperative.  This enabled market expectations to stabilise. 
 
Another challenge faced in the period under review relates to the real estate market. 
Specifically, the strong increase in house prices fuelled mainly by increased foreign 
and domestic demand, had already begun in the run-up to EU accession.  The high 
pace of price increases and the exposure of the banking sector to the real estate 
market through the granting of mortgage loans, raised concerns about possible 
negative repercussions for household debt and servicing as well as for the banks’ 
loan portfolios, especially in the case of tighter monetary conditions.  With a view to 
safeguarding financial stability and protecting deposits, the CBC issued a circular to 
banks requiring them to assess more thoroughly the creditworthiness of loan 
applicants and to strictly adhere to the set mortgage loan ceiling after accounting for 
adequate security pledged by the borrower. At the same time, the CBC 
communicated extensively to the public at large the risks inherent in mortgage 
borrowing. 
 
6. ERM II membership  
Despite the new challenges the economy faced post-EU accession the prudent mix of 
interest rate policy and exchange rate flexibility seemed to work.  As a result the 
Cyprus pound was in a strong position to participate in ERM II and answers had 
been provided to two of the three critical questions that need to be addressed by any 
accession country: 
1.  When to join ERM II? 16 
2.  At what central parity? 
3.  What is the optimal length of time for staying within the mechanism before 
adopting the euro?  
In the case of Cyprus, which had been successfully shadowing ERM I and II for more 
than ten years, it followed that the answer to the first question was that the Cyprus 
pound would join ERM II immediately upon accession to the EU.  The question of 
the central parity was answered back in 1992 when the Cyprus pound was linked to 
the ecu.  This parity had been tested over the years and it was natural for the 
authorities to want a continuation of this successful policy. Of course the question of 
the appropriate central parity had to be jointly determined with the ECB as well as 
with the central bank governors and finance ministers of the EU member countries. 
Apart from the successful long track record of the Cypriot currency, the prevailing 
central parity of €1,7086 per Cyprus pound was found to be consistent with 
economic fundamentals4. 
 
Turning now to the issue of the optimal length of the interim period before the 
adoption of the euro, the EU’s view on this matter is that ERM II should not be seen 
as a mere "waiting room" for the adoption of the euro.  Rather it is a meaningful 
policy framework within which to prepare the accession economies for monetary 
union and to achieve further real and nominal convergence.  The EU fears the 
premature adoption of the euro and the surrender of monetary and exchange rate 
policies without the accession countries achieving the necessary resilience, an 
essential condition for being a successful member of the euro area.  
 
Not only had Cyprus achieved price stability but in fact by the time of accession to 
the EU it had also achieved both significant nominal and real convergence5.  In turn, 
this placed the economy in a strong position to enter ERM ΙΙ and adopt the euro after 
participating in the mechanism for a minimum period only.  Besides the adherence 
over the long term to a stable parity of the Cyprus pound against the anchor 
currency, an argument for the adoption of the euro sooner rather than later could 
                                                           
4 See for example Kyriacou and Papageorgiou (2007) and Pattichis et al (2003).  
5 One of the concerns that should be taken into account when designing the appropriate exchange rate policy is 
that the catching - up process implies, through the Balassa - Samuelson (BS) effect, higher inflation.  However, 
evidence of the size of the BS effect in accession countries suggests that it only accounts for a limited share of the 
inflation differential with the euro area, of the order of 1% – 3% per annum.  For Cyprus, the BS effect could be 
even smaller given: (i) the per capita income level of Cyprus in PPP terms was about 80% in 2005 of the euro area 
average; and (ii) the high degree of openness of the economy, which means that the manufacturing sector is not a 
significant portion of the total economy. 
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also be made.  The concern that a country by prematurely adopting the euro would 
forego the significant tool of exchange rate did not effectively apply in the case of 
Cyprus.  As we have already explained, the exchange rate in Cyprus has never been 
used as a tool to restore competitiveness, even in times of turbulence such as in 1974 
or in the case of the 1992 ERM crisis. 
 
During the ERM II period the Cypriot economy continued to be confronted with 
some old and some new challenges.  On account of the prevailing interest 
differential between Cyprus and the euro area, capital continued to flow into the 
island partly in the form of foreign currency borrowing, which was mostly used for 
the purchase of property and consumption.  Fast credit growth coupled with the 
brisk pace of economic activity further exacerbated inflationary pressures.  Inflation, 
particular in the second half of 2007, followed an upward trend on account of rising 
oil and food prices.  The current account deficit at the end of 2007 had reached its 
highest level since 1978. The CBC reacted to these developments in terms of its 
communication to the public.  Specifically, it provided frequent reminders to the 
public of the exchange rate risk associated with borrowing in foreign currency. On 
the prudential side, the CBC issued guidelines reducing the maximum loan to value 
ratio associated with lending in real estate, and delayed decreases of the minimum 
reserve ratio to euro area standards.  The prevailing conditions at the time prevented 
the CBC from fully converging interest rates and the ratio of minimum reserve to the 
euro area levels ahead of time. Both were converged at the last minute before the 
adoption of the euro.  
 
7. Adoption of the euro:  challenges ahead                                                                                                  
The irrevocable fixing of the exchange rate, i.e. the setting of the conversion rate of 
the Cyprus pound to the euro, essentially meant the relinquishment of the conduct 
of monetary policy by the CBC. Setting domestic interest rates to contain inflation at 
the national level would no longer be possible. 
 
At the time when this loss in policy tools was taking place, inflationary pressures 
had already started mounting in the Cypriot economy. In particular, HICP-based 
inflation surged to 5,4% in August 2008, which was the result of both external and 
domestic factors as well as policy decisions precipitated by the accession of Cyprus 
to the euro area. On the domestic front, fast credit expansion was fuelling domestic 
demand, which added to higher inflation in the context of already strong economic 
activity (i.e. close to or above the potential rate). The reduction in the official interest 
rates of the CBC by 50 basis points in December 2007 and in the minimum reserve 18 
ratio to the level applied in the Eurosystem on 1 January 2008, were two key factors 
behind the rapid credit and money expansion.  The surge in oil and food prices was 
further exacerbating domestic inflationary pressures.  Moreover, heightened 
inflation expectations, linked to higher inflation perceptions formed in the run-up to 
euro adoption, appear to have also played a role, albeit a limited one, in aggravating 
price pressures through wage and price setting behaviour. It should be noted that 
excessive credit growth was also reflected in the widening of the current account 
deficit.  
 
Against this background and in the context of Cyprus’s monetary integration it soon 
became evident that the CBC could do little to remedy the situation and that the 
burden of tackling these challenges would mainly fall on other policy areas. Indeed, 
as most of the credit growth was channelled to the real estate and construction 
sectors, the CBC took macro-prudential measures in the area of banking supervision 
and, among other things, reduced the loan to value ratio with the aim of curtailing 
excessive credit growth and moderating the exposure of the banking sector to risks 
associated with these sectors. These were in fact the only measures that the CBC 
could take and were thereafter relaxed in light of some deceleration in key credit 
aggregates. 
 
With our accession to the euro area, fiscal policy and structural reforms should, in 
addition to their impact on stabilising economic activity, take into account their 
potential implications for price stability. It is well-established that in the context of a 
monetary union, adverse inflation differentials are detrimental to competitiveness 
and thus eventually harm economic growth and employment. It is therefore 
imperative to ensure that domestic inflation does not exceed the euro area average. 
Sound fiscal policies and the implementation of structural reforms aimed at fostering 
productivity and enhancing the labour market’s flexibility and adaptability are 
essential tools for containing inflationary pressures and preserving competitiveness. 
With respect to fiscal policies, these should also be oriented towards tackling the 
problem of long-term sustainability of public finances, which is particularly acute in 
Cyprus owing to an ageing population and the viability problem of the Social 
Insurance Fund.      
 
8. Conclusions and policy lessons 
The previous analysis has shown that the adherence to a simple monetary rule such 
as an exchange rate target can confer credibility on a central bank and deliver price 
stability, something particularly important for a small open economy. Maintaining a 
clear and unambiguous policy stance even under strain can boost policy credibility 19 
and facilitate future policies.  This hard earned credibility requires that a central 
bank enjoys some degree of relative independence.  Over a relative long period of 
time when there are phases of economic downturn or volatility the regime might be 
tested as political pressure for a devaluation increases.  Succumbing to these 
pressures could seriously undermine the credibility of a central bank.  Another 
important lesson drawn from the Cyprus case is that this strategy needs to be 
supplemented by additional measures.  Capital controls can be effective, though not 
an option in the European Union.  Monetary aggregates, and in particular credit, 
should be closely monitored and controlled, if necessary.  The current account also 
warrants close monitoring. This indicator along with monetary indicators reveal 
inflationary pressures and the sustainability of the exchange rate regime.   
 
Accession to the EU and preparing for euro adoption would render many of the 
supplementary measures either invalid or very difficult to apply. The eventual 
abolition of all restrictions requires that the authorities have well in advance a 
comprehensively thought out and prepared plan for the introduction of the 
necessary structural reforms and the abolition of any obstacles on the monetary and 
exchange rate fronts. Experience has shown that in Cyprus as well as in almost all of 
the new entrants to the EU, in  the run-up to ERM II and the adoption of the single 
currency, capital flows may be influenced by higher domestic interest rates, 
compared with those in the euro area, while at the same time markets may speculate 
about  entry levels. Countries may also be faced with asset booms and higher 
inflationary pressures.  To mitigate these challenges it is important for any aspirant 
country to achieve a high degree of nominal and real convergence with the EU 
economy before joining the ERM.  Once in ERM II differentials between domestic 
and euro area interest rates should be kept to a minimum providing less incentive 
for capital inflows. A country might also contemplate widening the margin of 
fluctuations in its exchange rate, thus increasing the exchange rate risk to potential 
speculators.  This path was also followed by Cyprus. The wider bands though were 
used only as a deterrent to speculation.  In practice the Cyprus pound continued to 
fluctuate within the narrow bands.   Finally, joining the euro should not be perceived 
as the end of the road.  Having gone through a difficult convergence process, 
governments tend to relax their efforts upon adoption of the euro.  On the contrary, 
fiscal consolidation should be more ambitious, taking into account that monetary 
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